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The God Exclusion 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
PROSELYTIZATION AND RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
Over the past several years, there has been increasing 
concern among the general public about religious discrimination 
and proselytization1 in the U.S. Military.2 Complaints about 
religious bias in the military have centered mostly on the 
proselytizing efforts of evangelical Christian soldiers and the 
pressure they have exerted on their nonevangelical counterparts 
to conform to Evangelical Christian ideals.3 These incidents are 
not uncommon. From 2005 to 2007, the Pentagon received fifty 
complaints of religious bias in the military.4 Other sources, 
however, maintain that religious discrimination is much more 
pervasive,5 placing the number of complaints for that time period 
at 11,000 or higher.6 
Claims of religious discrimination and proselytization in 
the military are the result of a variety of actors. At the center of 
the controversy is the military chaplaincy,7 an institution 
designed to minister to the religious needs of soldiers.8 Although 
  
 1 Proselytization means to convert someone to one’s own religious faith. 
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1119 (4th ed. 2000). 
 2 For the purposes of this note, the Military includes the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Coast Guard, and any other unit organized under the Department of Defense. 
Major (ret.) David E. Fitzkee & Captain Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: 
Navigating the Channel Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Ira 
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy 
and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 90 (2007).  
 3 Heather Cook, Service Before Self? Evangelicals Flying High at the U.S. 
Air Force Academy, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 1 (2007); John Milburn, Soldiers Pressured into 
Christianity, MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Dec. 29, 2007, at D5, available at 
2007 WLNR 25804393. 
 4 Eric Lichtblau, Questions Raised Anew About Religion in Military, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 1, 2009, at A14, available at 2009 WLNR 3930224. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Religion News Service, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, May 5, 2009, at U5, 
available at 2009 WLNR 8867290. 
 7 Steven H. Aden, The Navy’s Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy 
Forfeited Its Constitutional Legitimacy by Establishing Denominational Preferences?, 
31 W. ST. U. L. REV 185, 187 (2004); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 90. 
 8 Aden, supra note 7, at 186-87. 
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the chaplaincy program is per se constitutional,9 chaplains have 
drawn criticism for allegedly overstepping their statutorily 
defined duties.10 Another source of controversy is high-ranking 
military officials. In 2006, seven officers, including four generals, 
appeared in uniform to fund-raise for an evangelical Bible-study 
group.11 Other complaints involve institutional discrimination. 
For instance, at the Air Force Academy, Christian cadets 
attending off-campus Sunday services or Bible study are given 
passes that do not count as leave, but non-Christian soldiers 
who worship on other days of the week must take leave to attend 
religious services.12 Religious discrimination and proselytization 
also find a home in peer interaction. According to one complaint, 
“soldiers who are open about their non-belief can face 
harassment and ostracizing from fellow troops.”13 
Behind the public debate about religion’s role in the 
military, these claims implicate a complex array of 
constitutional issues. As an entity regulated by Congress,14 the 
military is subject to the limitations imposed by the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”15 This phrase 
encompasses the Constitution’s two religion clauses, the 
Establishment Clause16 and the Free Exercise Clause.17 
Proselytization in the military implicates such complex 
constitutional issues due, in part, to the inherent difficulty of 
delineating clear legal rules from the religion clauses.18 This 
difficulty is exacerbated by the long history of affording judicial 
deference to the military.19 
This note analyzes how Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has developed to deal with contemporary issues 
  
 9 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 10 Aden, supra note 7, at 187. 
 11 Neela Banerjee, Solider Sues Army, Saying His Atheism Led to Threats, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A14, available at 2008 WLNR 7760637. 
 12 Cook, supra note 3, at 6. 
 13 Kay Campbell, Atheists Wonder if Fellow Troops Have Their Backs, MOBILE 
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Oct. 20, 2007, at D1, available at 2007 WLNR 21287415. 
 14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13. 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16 Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”). 
 17 Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”). 
 18 Major Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal 
Analysis of Religion Issues in the Army, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1998, at 1, 3. 
 19 Stephen Lewis Rabinowitz, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense: Restricting 
the Religious Rights of Military Servicemembers, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1985). 
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of religious discrimination in the military. Part I provides 
background information on contemporary military life. In 
particular, it details some of the formal and informal 
complaints of religious discrimination and proselytization in 
the military. Part I also discusses the military culture of 
conformity and argues that strict adherence to military 
regulations and a hierarchical chain of command make military 
life inherently coercive. Part II analyzes the Establishment 
Clause standards developed by the Supreme Court. Part III 
examines the Establishment Clause in the context of the 
Constitution’s other religion clause, the Free Exercise Clause. 
In particular, Part III discusses the constitutionality of the 
military chaplaincy as an institution and seeks to define 
proselytization in the context of the Constitution’s two religion 
clauses. Part IV analyzes the current state of Establishment 
Clause controversies in the military by examining the alleged 
perpetrators of religious discrimination and the 
constitutionality of their conduct.  
Ultimately, this note argues that religious discrimination 
and proselytization in the military should be analyzed under the 
Establishment Clause using what is commonly referred to as the 
coercion test. Under the coercion test, if the alleged incidents of 
religious discrimination and proselytization are true, the U.S. 
Military has violated the Establishment Clause and should take 
measures to cure the constitutional deficiency. Appropriate 
remedial measures include the institution and enforcement of 
nondiscrimination policies as well as institutional assurance 
that soldiers will not be subjected to proselytizing by fellow 
soldiers or superior officers. 
I. RELIGION IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
 The constitutional implications of proselytization and 
religious discrimination in the U.S. Military are of particular 
importance because contemporary controversies have become 
ubiquitous. The proliferation of these complaints is particularly 
troubling when one considers the inherently coercive nature of 
military life. 
A. Alleged Incidents of Misconduct 
The contemporary controversy about religion’s role in 
the U.S. Military results in part from publicity garnered by 
lawsuits against the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
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U.S. Air Force (USAF). In 2007, Specialist Jeremy Hall, at that 
time an active member of the U.S. Army and deployed in Iraq, 
filed suit against the DOD and his superior officer, Major 
Freddy Welborn.20 The lawsuit sought injunctive relief from a 
pattern and practice of promoting religion in the Army.21 Hall 
alleged that he was discriminated against because he is an 
atheist.22 In his complaint, Hall claimed that on Thanksgiving 
Day 2006, he was castigated by a superior officer and 
ostracized by his peers because he chose not to participate in a 
premeal Christian prayer.23 Hall also stated that Major 
Welborn threatened to bring charges against him under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and to bar him from re-
enlistment because he had organized and participated in 
atheist meetings.24 In a sworn statement, Hall claimed that 
Major Welborn told him, “People like you are not holding up 
the Constitution and are going against what the founding 
fathers, who were Christian, wanted for America!”25 Specialist 
Hall also informally complained that “soldiers who are open 
about their non-belief can face harassment and ostracizing 
from fellow troops . . . .”26 In fact, Hall alleged that he received 
threats of “fragging” (attempts to wound or kill a fellow soldier 
by throwing a grenade or similar explosive)27 in response to his 
organization of atheists.28 
In addition to Specialist Hall’s complaint against the 
DOD, there have been widespread allegations of religious 
discrimination and proselytization in the USAF and at the 
USAF Academy.29 One of the most prominent incidents of 
religious intolerance involves the USAF Academy head football 
coach, who allegedly draped a banner in the team locker room 
  
 20 Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Military Religious Freedom Found. 
v. Gates, No. 07-2444-JWL (D. Kan., filed Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Hall Complaint]. 
 21 Injunctive relief was partially sought pursuant to the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Banerjee, supra note 11 (Major Welborn contends that the contents of 
Hall’s complaint are false. Nevertheless, Hall, now with a different unit, claims that 
backlash against him have continued. Since the filing of the complaint, one sergeant 
has physically threatened Hall and another sergeant allegedly told Hall that he was 
“not entitled to religious freedom because he had no religion at all.”). 
 26 Campbell, supra note 13. 
 27 John Ayto, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SLANG 103 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 28 Campbell, supra note 13. 
 29 Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 3. 
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that read, “I am a Christian first and last, I am a member of 
Team Jesus.”30 Despite the negative publicity garnered by this 
action, the football coach publically affirmed his position, 
stating that “[r]eligion is what we’re all about at the 
Academy.”31 Further examples of religious discrimination and 
proselytization at the USAF Academy include an alleged 
incident in which a history professor required students to pray 
before allowing them to begin a final exam,32 and, more 
generally, the ostracizing of cadets who chose not to attend 
chapel services.33 These are only a few examples of what has 
been described as the Academy’s general preference for 
Christians over non-Christians.34 
In 2005, after growing frustrated with the USAF’s 
reaction to informal complaints of religious discrimination, 
Michael Weinstein, a former USAF Academy cadet, filed an 
action against the USAF.35 Weinstein sought permanent 
injunctive relief so that “[n]o member of the USAF, including a 
chaplain, [would be] permitted to evangelize, proselytize, or in 
any related way attempt to involuntarily convert, pressure, 
exhort, or persuade a fellow member of the USAF to accept 
their own religious beliefs while on duty.”36 The lawsuit alleged 
a “severe, systematic, and pervasive” pattern of religious 
discrimination.37 Thus, like the Hall complaint, the Weinstein 
complaint charged that religious discrimination had become 
institutionalized.38 In particular, the lawsuit alleged, among 
other things, that cadets were encouraged by chaplains to 
convert fellow cadets, that cadets were forced to participate in 
nonsecular prayers at Academy events, that non-Christian and 
nonreligious cadets were persistently harassed with slurs, and 
that during Basic Cadet Training, an Air Force chaplain once 
  
 30 Cook, supra note 3, at 8. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 7. 
 33 Id. at 6. 
 34 See generally id. at 6-8; Banerjee, supra note 11; Milburn, supra note 3. 
 35 Amended Complaint for Violation of Constitutional Rights para. 30, 
Weinstein v. U.S. Air Force, No. CIV-05-1064 JP/LAM (D.N.M. Oct. 31, 2005) 
[hereinafter Weinstein Complaint]. The suit has been dismissed without prejudice as to 
Weinstein, but an appeal is likely. Cook, supra note 3, at 1 n.1. 
 36 Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, para. 18. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Cook, supra note 3, at 1; Kenneth J. Schweiker, Military Chaplains: 
Federally Funded Fanaticism and the United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS 
J.L. & RELIGION, Fall 2006, at 14-15. 
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told cadets that if they refused to proselytize, they would “burn 
in the fires of hell.”39 
Although much of the controversy about religion in the 
military has focused on the Hall and Weinstein complaints, and 
on activity at the USAF Academy, additional allegations 
suggest a widespread problem. For example, nine midshipmen 
of the U.S. Naval Academy have lobbied to eliminate 
mandatory lunchtime prayer at the Naval Academy.40 The DOD 
has also come under fire for allowing two fundamentalist 
Christian organizations exclusive access to several military 
bases.41 One soldier claimed that, upon returning from a tour of 
duty in Iraq, he was forced to attend “a ceremony that began 
and ended with a Christian prayer.”42 More recently, a soldier 
complained that his unit was forced to choose between 
attending a Christian rock concert or cleaning their barracks.43 
Complaints about religious discrimination and proselytization 
in the U.S. Military thus implicate a broad spectrum of 
military personnel and institutions. 
B. Coercive Nature of the Military 
Complaints about religious discrimination and 
proselytization in the military are particularly disquieting 
considering the unique nature of military life. Courts have 
consistently recognized that “[t]he military constitutes a 
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from 
that of the civilian.”44 One of the principal ways military life 
differs from civilian life is that unit cohesiveness is achieved 
through socialization—a policy of each branch of the U.S. 
  
 39 Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, paras. 14-17, 19. 
 40 Religion’s Place in Annapolis, VA. PILOT & LEDGER STAR, June 30, 2008, 
available at 2008 WLNR 12258162. The lunchtime prayer is a tradition that involves a 
chaplain leading grace. Although midshipmen are not required to pray, all midshipmen 
must stand and bow their heads during the pre-meal ritual. Josh Mitchell, Mealtime 
Prayer Again Under Fire—ACLU Threatens to Take Legal Action Against Academy, 
BALT. SUN, June 26, 2008, at 1A, available at 2008 WLNR 11998565. 
 41 Is it Legal? Church and State, 57 NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
24, Jan. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8924032. 
 42 Lichtblau, supra note 4. 
 43 Steve Szkotak, Troops: Skipping Christian Concert Got Us Punished, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 20, 2010, available at http://huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/21/ 
troops-skipping-christian_n_690032.html. 
 44 Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1971) (quoting Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)); accord Cook, supra note 3, at 14. 
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Military.45 For example, “service before self” is a core concept at 
the USAF.46 This model requires that personal interests be 
subordinate to USAF regulations.47 The Virginia Military 
Institute (VMI) has a comparable philosophy. There, first-year 
cadets are collectively rewarded when one cadet contributes to 
VMI objectives and collectively punished when one cadet 
detracts from those objectives.48 Similarly, the U.S. Army aims 
for a common ethical and moral base throughout its units.49 
Military socialization is thus built on the notion that each 
solider is part of a larger unit.50 This ideal is epitomized in the 
U.S. Army’s former slogan, “An Army of One.”51 
A key facet of military socialization is strict adherence to 
codes of conduct.52 Each branch of the U.S. Military institutes its 
own regulations. In the Army, for instance, all soldiers must 
adhere to exacting uniform and grooming standards.53 
Regulations are also in place at military colleges and 
universities. At the USAF Academy, codes of conduct structure 
almost every aspect of a cadet’s life.54 For example, all cadets 
must dine at the Academy mess hall; cadets are required to 
spend Saturday mornings studying; and first-year cadets are not 
allowed to wear civilian clothing without approval from their 
Commandant—even when on leave or on the weekend.55 
Similarly, codes and regulations control what cadets at VMI do 
most hours of the day.56 In particular, cadets at VMI are required 
to regularly participate in drills and to join in traditional dining 
ceremonies, and first-year cadets are subjected to hazing 
rituals.57 The implicit message articled by these rules is that 
  
 45 William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause 
Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
1493, 1522. 
 46 Cook, supra note 3, at 14. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 49 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1524. 
 50 Id. at 1526. 
 51 Captain Eugene Y. Kim, The Judge Advocate Recruiting Office: The 
Gateway to Service, ARMY LAW., June 2004, at 38. 
 52 Cook, supra note 3, at 14. 
 53 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1526. 
 54 Cook, supra note 3, at 14. 
 55 Id. at 14-15. 
 56 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 361-63 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 57 Id. 
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deviation is not tolerated. “In this strictly regimented world, . . . 
debate, dissent, and deliberation have no place.”58 
The types of military regulations previously mentioned 
are primarily enforced through a hierarchical chain of 
command. Socialization teaches soldiers to obey the commands 
of their authority figures.59 This process trains soldiers to 
respect institutional leadership and discourages soldiers from 
challenging authority.60 This culture of conformity is 
continually reinforced by military leaders, who are expected to 
persistently convey and promote military values to their 
subordinates.61 While this type of indoctrination may ultimately 
develop unit cohesiveness, mandated adherence to regimented 
codes of conduct raises the issue of voluntariness. To be sure, 
enlistment in the various branches of the U.S. Military is done 
by choice. But the decision to enlist does not eliminate the 
possibility of coercion while serving in the military.62 As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[P]eer group pressure to 
conform to established practices is a forceful form of coercion.”63 
Voluntary participation in military activities is thus 
circumscribed by the coercion inherent in the military’s chain 
of command structure.64 Subordinates have no real ability to 
tell their commanding officer they are not interested in obeying 
that commander’s orders.65 This dynamic magnifies the risk of 
coerced religious activity and government-enforced preference 
for certain religions or religion generally.66  
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”67 Eleven years after its 
ratification, Thomas Jefferson famously articled the notion that 
the First Amendment establishes a “wall of . . . separation 
  
 58 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1525. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 63 Id. at 296. 
 64 Schweiker, supra note 38, at 36. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1528. 
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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between church and state.”68 Although seemingly absolute in its 
terms, there are few areas of constitutional law that are as 
complex as those implicated by the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment.69 In fact, as Chief Justice Burger wrote, 
“[W]e can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this 
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. . . . Total 
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some 
relationship between government and religious organizations is 
inevitable.”70 This inherent line-drawing difficulty is 
exacerbated in the military context because courts often defer 
to military policies that purport to “enhance military readiness 
and promote national safety.”71 
The Establishment Clause is typically implicated when 
the government takes action that is perceived to help or 
advance religion.72 The overarching idea is that the government 
may not favor one religion over another or generally favor 
religion over nonreligion; rather, a government stance on 
religion must be neutral.73 To that end, the Supreme Court has 
established three tests for Establishment Clause controversies. 
A. The Lemon Test 
The Supreme Court established the predominant 
Establishment Clause standard in Lemon v. Kurtzman.74 In 
Lemon, the Court emphasized that there are “[t]hree main evils 
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford 
protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”75 To 
safeguard against these types of government intrusion, the 
Court articulated a conjunctive three-prong test. Under the 
  
 68 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n of Conn. (Jan. 
1, 1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg. 
 69 Benjamin, supra note 18, at 3; Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1499. 
 70 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 614 (1971). 
 71 Aden, supra note 7, at 196; Rabinowitz, supra note 19, at 897. 
 72 Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 8. 
 73 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for 
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental 
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’” 
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))). 
 74 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Lemon decision struck down Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania statutes that provided state subsidization of private-school (including 
parochial-school) teachers’ salaries. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07. 
 75 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
816 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
Lemon test, a law or governmental action that is religiously 
neutral on its face does not violate the Establishment Clause if 
(1) it has a secular purpose,76 (2) its principal or primary effect 
is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,77 and (3) it 
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.78 A challenged action or law is constitutional only if all 
three prongs are satisfied.79 
  
 76 Id. at 612-13. The first prong of the Lemon Test, whether there is a secular 
purpose, involves an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the government or 
government agent. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.2d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003). The Supreme 
Court has held that purpose is determined by looking at the text of the statute or 
government action at issue as an “objective observer.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 
U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). 
If there is more than one legitimate purpose, one of which is not secular, the analysis 
shifts to what the primary or predominant purpose is. Id. at 860 (“When the 
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it 
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there 
being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”); see also 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). That said, singular, or even multiple, 
“purposes” are difficult to ascertain. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 863. As a result, 
courts are typically deferential to a state’s asserted secular purpose and it is usually 
only when a government’s stated purpose is found to be a sham or the law or action at 
issue is explicitly religious that it is overturned. Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled 
Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United States Military, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 261-62 
(2004). The first prong of the Lemon Test is therefore a relatively low hurdle to 
overcome. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
invalidated governmental action for improper purpose under the Establishment Clause 
in only five cases since Lemon was decided in 1971). 
 77 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The second prong, whether the principle or 
primary effect is one that advances or inhibits religion, is arguably “the most 
significant part of the Lemon test” and is often “the crux” of an Establishment Clause 
controversy. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 10. Unlike the determination of 
whether there is a secular purpose, analysis of the “effects” prong is an objective 
determination that measures “whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, 
the practice under review . . . conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” 
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)). This prong 
ostensibly targets statutes or government action whose primary or predominant effect 
advances religion but whose purpose could not otherwise be identified. The “effects” 
prong does not, however, target statutes or government action whose secondary or 
tertiary effect incidentally advances religion, Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 10, 
because the Supreme Court’s holdings “do not call for a total separation between 
church and state,” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. 
 78 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The third and final prong of the Lemon Test, 
whether government action has fostered an excessive entanglement with religion, looks 
at the extent to which government intrudes into church matters or to the extent to 
which government allows religious entities to influence governmental matters. Fitzkee 
& Linell, supra note 2, at 10. Because there cannot be an absolute separation of church 
and state, government entanglement exists on a spectrum, “with some entanglements 
. . . more egregious than others.” Bindon, supra note 76, at 263. Thus, in evaluating 
whether there is an excessive entanglement with religion, courts take a comprehensive 
approach and examine such factors as “the character and purposes of the institutions 
that are benefited [and] the nature of the . . . resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. The Supreme Court 
has “permitted the States to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or 
nonideological services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches, 
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The Lemon test has been widely criticized since Lemon 
was decided in 197180—even by members of the Supreme 
Court.81 In fact, the Court has explicitly declined to limit 
Establishment Clause controversies to a single standard.82 In 
the years since Lemon was decided, the Supreme Court has 
applied other tests in Establishment Clause controversies.83 
And in some instances, the Court has ignored the Lemon test 
altogether.84 Nevertheless, Lemon has yet to be overturned.85 
B. The Endorsement Test 
The Supreme Court clouded the waters of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in 1989, when it decided 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU. At issue in that case was the 
constitutionality of two different holiday displays, a crèche and 
a menorah, located on public property.86 The Court framed the 
issue of constitutionality as whether the government had 
appeared to have taken a position on questions of religious 
belief.87 The Court emphasized that “whether the key word is 
endorsement, favoritism, or promotion,” the essential 
Establishment Clause principle is the same.88 
  
public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students [have 
been held] not . . . to offend the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 616-17. 
 79 Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
 80 See, e.g., Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1502; Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 11. 
 81 One example is Justice Rehnquist who wrote in a dissenting opinion to 
Wallace v. Jaffree that the Lemon test “has no more grounding in the history of the First 
Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests.” Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 110 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 900 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 82 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 83 See Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cnty. 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 84 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 85 See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859 (“Ever since Lemon v. Kurtzman 
summarized the three familiar considerations for evaluating Establishment Clause 
claims, looking to whether government action has ‘a secular legislative purpose’ has 
been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of our cases.”). 
 86 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 588. 
 87 Id. at 594. 
 88 Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, the 
Court held that the crèche was unconstitutional because, standing alone inside the main 
entrance of the county courthouse, it had an unmistakably clear religious meaning. Id. at 
598. On the other hand, the Court held that the display of the menorah was 
constitutional. Id. at 614. Unlike the crèche, which stood alone, the eighteen-foot 
menorah was displayed with a forty-five-foot Christmas tree. Id. at. 617. The Court thus 
reasoned that the dual-display failed to give the appearance that the county was taking a 
position on anything other than the secular celebration of the winter holidays. Id. at 616. 
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The crux of this new analysis—known today as the 
endorsement test—is whether a reasonable and informed 
observer would view the government’s action as an endorsement 
of religion.89 In fashioning this additional Establishment Clause 
standard, the Court’s main concern was that the endorsement of 
any one religion would effectively elevate its members to an 
“insider” status90 while relegating nonadherents to the position of 
secondary citizens.91 Thus, if government has endorsed one 
religion over another—or, more generally, religion over 
nonreligion—it has violated the principle of neutrality that is 
fundamental to the Establishment Clause.92 Many courts, 
however, view the endorsement test as a mere refinement of the 
Lemon test’s “effects” prong.93 Others have chosen to ignore the 
endorsement test altogether and have continued to use the 
Lemon standard.94 
C. The Coercion Test 
Although the majority opinion in County of Allegheny is 
famous for its adaption of a new constitutional standard, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, is also significant. Kennedy reasoned that coercion is 
central to any Establishment Clause analysis because it would 
be difficult for government to “establish a religion without 
some measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form 
of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would 
sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to 
observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that 
amounts in fact to proselytizing.”95 Kennedy concluded that 
“[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty 
by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”96 
  
 89 Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 12. 
 90 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1503-04. 
 91 Id. at 1504. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003); Cook, supra 
note 3, at 19; see also Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that some courts 
have questioned whether the endorsements test is part of the Lemon analysis); Deanna 
N. Pihos, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause 
at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1357 (2005). 
 94 See Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997); Chaudhuri v. 
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 95 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989). 
 96 Id. at 662. 
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In 1992, the Supreme Court formally adopted Justice 
Kennedy’s coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman.97 That case 
shifted the focus of Establishment Clause jurisprudence with 
respect to school prayer and introduced what is now commonly 
known as the coercion test.98 The issue in Lee was whether a 
graduation ceremony at a Rhode Island middle school violated 
the Establishment Clause because the benediction and 
invocation, which were led by a rabbi, had religious content.99 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that there “are 
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from 
subtle coercive pressure in elementary and public schools.”100 The 
Lee Court was particularly concerned that, given the students’ 
ages and the social pressure to attend graduation, there was no 
real alternative to standing and listening to the religious 
speech.101 Although the pressure was both subtle and indirect, it 
was also “as real as any overt compulsion.”102 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s belief that coercion is an 
essential element of all Establishment Clause controversies, 
the Lee holding was explicitly limited to primary and secondary 
education.103 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, an 
example of an application of the coercion test, the Court struck 
down a Texas public school district’s policy of using student 
referenda to decide whether religious prayers would be 
included at graduation and before football games.104 Although 
the prayers in Santa Fe were chosen by students—unlike Lee 
where the school superintendant had decided the prayer 
  
 97 505 U.S. 577, 579 (1992). 
 98 Prior to the introduction of the coercion test, the Supreme Court had 
consistently held that organized and official prayer at schools violates the 
Establishment Clause. Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1507. In 1962, the Supreme Court in 
Engel v. Vitale struck down a requirement that New York public school students recite 
a religious prayer at the start of each school day. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The next year, 
the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring daily Bible reading at the 
beginning of the school day. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963). The common thread of these cases was the Court’s concern that prayer was an 
official part of the public school curriculum. Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1508. The Court 
denied the opportunity to overturn Lemon because the issue before the Court could be 
decided outside the Lemon framework. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 99 The invocation started, “God of the Free, Hope of the Brave.” The 
benediction began, “O God, we are grateful to You . . . .” and ended, “We give thanks to 
You, Lord . . . .” Lee, 505 U.S. at 580-82 (1992). 
 100 Id. at 592. 
 101 Id. at 593. “[A]bsence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits 
which have motivated the student through youth and all her high school years.” Id. at 595. 
 102 Id. at 593. 
 103 Id. 
 104 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
820 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
policy—the Court found this distinction constitutionally 
insignificant.105 In both cases, the school prayer had the 
“improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an 
act of religious worship.”106 Since Lee, the Supreme Court has 
upheld all state-sponsored religious activities in nonprimary 
and nonsecondary schools. 
1. Prayer at Public Universities 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s limitation of the 
Lee holding, two federal courts have upheld formal prayers 
during public university graduations. In Tanford v. Brand, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to 
Indiana University’s invocation and benediction at 
graduation.107 The dispositive issue for the Tanford court was 
that the students were adults, rather than younger students, 
and that attendance at the ceremony was not at all 
compulsory.108 The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar stance in 
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, where a Tennessee State University 
faculty member challenged the use of prayer and moments of 
silence at university events.109 Echoing the reasoning of 
Tanford, the Chaudhuri court concluded that college-educated 
adults would not be unduly influenced by the prayers.110 
2. Prayer at Military Colleges 
For the Tanford and Chaudhuri courts, the age of the 
students was the dispositive factor; because the students were 
adults, religious speech at school events was not coercive.111 The 
prayers at issue in those cases, however, were outside of a 
  
 105 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1510. 
 106 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. at 312. 
 107 The nonsectarian prayers at issue were delivered by local clergy and were 
substantively similar to those at issue in Lee. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 
(7th Cir. 1997). 
 108 Id. at 985. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the prayers 
violated the Lemon Test. In upholding the constitutionality of the prayers, the court 
held that the invocation and benediction served the legitimate secular purpose of 
solemnizing the occasion. Id. at 986. 
 109 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 110 Id. at 237. The court also subjected the prayers to the Lemon Test. In doing 
so, the court held that the prayers passed all three prongs of the standard. In particular, 
the court stated that “[n]o reasonable observer could conclude that [Tennessee State 
University], merely by requesting a moment of silence at its functions, places its stamp of 
approval on any particular religion or religion in general.” Id. at 237-38. 
 111 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1511. 
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military context.112 Two federal circuit courts have struck down 
religious activity at military colleges, however. In Anderson v. 
Laird, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held as 
unconstitutional a military regulation requiring cadets at the 
U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, and USAF 
Academy to attend religious services on Sundays.113 The 
Anderson court rejected the regulation in three important 
ways. First, the court refused to defer to military judgment on 
the necessity of the regulations.114 While the court recognized 
the military’s need to regulate its day-to-day operations and to 
ascertain the essential characteristics of fitness for duty,115 it 
affirmed its jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutional 
significance.116 Second, although the court recognized that 
individuals necessarily give up certain freedoms when they 
enter the military, it held that enlistment could not be 
conditioned on soldiers’ relinquishment of their religious 
freedoms.117 Third, the court emphasized, “[T]he fact that 
attendance at the military academies is voluntary does not 
eliminate the possibility of coercion.”118 More significantly, 
however, it was of no importance that some cadets could be 
excused because of conscientiously held beliefs;119 as instituted, 
the policy was per se unconstitutional.120 
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Mellen v. Bunting, where the panel rejected the notion that 
citizens entirely forfeit their freedoms by entering the military.121 
The issue in Mellen was the constitutionality of a “supper 
prayer” at VMI.122 In a unanimous decision, the Mellen court held 
that “VMI’s supper prayer exacts an unconstitutional toll on the 
  
 112 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 233; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 983. 
 113 Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cadets were 
required to attend Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish Chapel services. Failure to attend 
one of these three services would result in punishment. Id.  
 114 Id. at 296. 
 115 Id. at 294-95. 
 116 Id. at 296. 
 117 Id. at 294. “To decline to apply the [Establishment] Clause absolutely . . . is 
to create a loophole in the scope of its protection which the Supreme Court simply does 
not admit.” Id. at 290. 
 118 Id. at 295. 
 119 Id. at 293. 
 120 Id. at 296. 
 121 See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 122 Each day, prior to supper, a short prayer is given that gives thanks or asks 
for God’s blessing. Id. at 362. VMI is a state-sponsored military college whose primary 
goal is to prepare its cadets for military service. Id. at 360-61. 
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consciences of religious objectors.”123 Central to its holding was 
the coercive nature of VMI’s strict codes of conduct,124 which 
were, in many respects, similar to military regulations.125 To 
accomplish the school’s mission of training soldiers, VMI uses an 
adversative method of training that is “predicated on the 
importance of creating doubt about previous beliefs and 
experiences in order to create a mindset conducive to the values 
VMI attempts to impart.”126 As such, although the students in 
question were not children, the court found that they were 
“uniquely susceptible to coercion.”127 The Mellen court thus 
rejected the rigidity of Chaudhuri and Tanford, which focused 
strictly on the age of the students in question.128 
Importantly, the Mellen court used the Lee coercion test 
as its primary authority. While the Mellen court accepted 
Lemon’s prevalence in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
acknowledged that it has not been overturned, it concluded 
that the coercion test should be the initial point of analysis in 
the context of school prayer.129 In striking down VMI’s mealtime 
prayer policy, the court thus emphasized the coercive nature of 
the institution’s educational mission.130 
III. BALANCING ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE 
The second religion clause of the First Amendment is 
the Free Exercise Clause. Interpreted as a limitation on the 
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause states, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”131 The 
Free Exercise Clause’s essential purpose is to protect the 
individual right to practice any religion or to choose not to 
practice religion at all.132 The fundamental question implicated 
  
 123 Id. at 372. 
 124 Cook, supra note 3, at 16. 
 125 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361. 
 126 Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127 Id. at 371. Essential to the court’s conclusion was that the communal dining 
experience was essentially obligatory. Id. at 372. All first year cadets are required to 
attend supper at the mess hall and, although all other cadets can opt to eat elsewhere, 
the only alternatives are vending machines and ordering pizza. Id. at 361 n.3. 
 128 Id. at 371. 
 129 Id. at 370-71. 
 130 Id. at 371. 
 131 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 132 Schweiker, supra note 38, at 7. 
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by issues of religious speech is therefore whether the speech is 
protected under the Free Exercise Clause or prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause.133 In theory, the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause work in tandem to promote the 
common end of “religious freedom in the context of government 
neutrality.”134 In practice, however, the two clauses have 
competing and sometimes irreconcilable interests.135 Tension 
between the two clauses arises when the government’s efforts 
to avoid the endorsement of religion also prohibits private 
religious practice.136 As a result, the disposition of a case 
involving religious speech often turns on whether the court 
frames the issue as an Establishment Clause controversy or a 
Free Exercise controversy.137 
A. The First Amendment and the Military Chaplaincy 
The tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause is exemplified by the existence of the 
military chaplaincy. Exercising its power under Article I, Section 
8 of the Constitution, Congress created a military to provide for 
a national defense.138 In doing so, Congress also directed that the 
military’s peace establishment consist of all organizations and 
persons necessary to aid soldiers in battle.139 As part of this 
directive, Congress has specifically authorized a military 
chaplaincy140 to meet the religious needs of the members of the 
U.S. Military.141 A funded division of the U.S. Military,142 the 
military chaplaincy consists of three separate institutions: the 
Chaplains Corps of the Army, the Chaplains Corps of the Navy, 
and the Air Force Chaplains Service.143 The codes of conduct vary 
somewhat by institution based on each service’s particular 
mission, but all three groups function under the auspices of the 
DOD, the agency given statutory authorization to implement the 
  
 133 Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech Is 
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83, 83 (2007). 
 134 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519. 
 135 Cook, supra note 3, at 25; Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519. 
 136 Cook, supra note 3, at 25. 
 137 Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519-20. 
 138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 139 10 U.S.C. § 3062(d) (2006); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 140 10 U.S.C. § 3073 (2006). 
 141 Id. § 3547 (2006); Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226.  
 142 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 229. 
 143 “Navy Chaplains also serve the Marine Corps, Coast Guard and the 
Merchant Marine.” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 116. 
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chaplaincy.144 According to DOD Directive 1304.19(4.1), military 
chaplaincies are “established to advise and assist commanders 
in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free 
exercise of religion in the context of military service as 
guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .”145 The directive further 
states that military chaplaincies 
[s]hall serve a religiously diverse population. Within the military, 
commanders are required to provide comprehensive religious 
support to all authorized individuals within their areas of 
responsibility. Religious Organizations that choose to participate in 
the Chaplaincies recognize this command imperative and express 
willingness for their Religious Ministry Professionals (RMPs) to 
perform their professional duties as chaplains in cooperation with 
RMPs from other religious traditions.
146
 
The legal conflict over the existence of the military chaplaincy 
thus centers on whether the government is simply allowing 
soldiers to freely exercise their First Amendment religious 
rights or whether, by creating and funding the military 
chaplaincy, it has established a nonneutral preference for 
religion in violation of the First Amendment. 
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
military chaplaincy’s constitutionality,147 the Second Circuit, in 
Katcoff v. Marsh, upheld it as constitutionally valid.148 The 
court’s first reason for doing so was based on the holding of 
Marsh v. Chambers,149 a Supreme Court decision upholding the 
constitutionality of a chaplain-led prayer before sessions of the 
Nebraska legislature.150 The dispositive issue in Marsh was that 
the prayer, having been performed for over one hundred years, 
was a deeply rooted tradition in the state.151 Although the prayer 
took a step towards government establishment of religion,152 the 
Court noted that the practice was part of Nebraska’s social 
fabric, which alleviated the Court’s fears about any proselytizing 
  
 144 Id. 
 145 DOD Directive No. 1304.19(4.1) (June 11, 2004). 
 146 Id. at 4.2. 
 147 Aden, supra note 7, at 189. 
 148 In that case, two Harvard law students, neither of which was a member of 
the U.S. Military, challenged the existence of the Army chaplaincy as a federally 
funded program under the Establishment Clause. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 224-
25 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 149 See generally id. at 237-38. 
 150 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983). 
 151 Id. at 790. 
 152 Id. at 795. 
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effects.153 In Marsh, the Supreme Court thus adopted a historical 
exception to the Lemon test.154 Relying on the reasoning of 
Marsh, the Katcoff court noted a similar unbroken tradition of 
chaplains in the military and concluded that the military 
chaplaincy fit within that historical exception.155 
The Katcoff court’s second reason for upholding the 
military chaplaincy was deference to military judgment on the 
issue.156 The court’s analysis acknowledged that the military 
chaplaincy, viewed in isolation, would fail to meet the criteria 
of Lemon.157 However, the court also held that the chaplaincy 
must be viewed in the context of the War Powers Clause of 
Article I, Section 8.158 Under the War Powers Clause, “[j]udges 
are not given the task of running the Army” because the 
military is a unique “community governed by a separate 
discipline from that of the civilian . . . . [Thus, w]hile members 
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by 
the First Amendment, the different character of the military 
community and of the military mission requires a different 
application of those protections.”159 The Katcoff court thus 
stated that military decisions are presumptively valid and that 
any doubt about the constitutionality of a military policy 
should be treated with judicial comity.160 The permissibility of 
the chaplaincy program, therefore, hinged on whether, after 
considering practical alternatives, the institution was relevant 
and necessary to a national defense.161 In the military’s opinion, 
soldiers turn to religion to cope with the trauma of being 
uprooted from their homes, thousands of miles away, to wage 
war.162 According to the military, the chaplaincy is an integral 
part of maintaining a national defense.163 
Under the view of religion as an integral part of 
national defense, chaplains provide a vital resource to 
soldiers.164 Thus, as the Katcoff court’s third basis for upholding 
  
 153 Id. 
 154 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 234. 
 157 Id. at 232. 
 158 Id. at 233. 
 159 Id. at 233-34. 
 160 Id. at 234. 
 161 Id. at 235. 
 162 Id. at 228. 
 163 Id. at 237-38. 
 164 The Katcoff court stated: 
 
826 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
the chaplaincy institution, the court reasoned that, without the 
chaplaincy, soldiers would be deprived of their Free Exercise 
Clause right to freely practice religion.165 Because the military 
requires soldiers to live on bases that are often far from their 
religious communities and where organized worship is not 
always available,166 the court reasoned the that Free Exercise 
Clause actually requires the military to institute a chaplaincy 
program.167 The provision of churches and chaplains at military 
establishments, according the court, is therefore an 
“appropriate accommodation between the two Clauses.”168 
In its ruling, the Katcoff panel addressed the existence 
of the program as an all-or-nothing proposition.169 As such, the 
court’s holding was limited in several important ways. First, 
the court assumed the chaplaincy met the requirement of 
voluntariness because it determined that the chaplaincy 
allowed soldiers to freely decide whether to worship without 
the fear of discipline or stigma.170 Second, and more 
importantly, the court explicitly stated that “[n]o chaplain is 
authorized to proselytize soldiers or their families.”171 It would 
seem, then, that Katcoff restricts chaplains to an inherently 
passive role—tending to the spiritual needs of soldiers that 
seek chaplain services on their own volition, rather than 
actively influencing soldiers to change their religious beliefs.172 
Ultimately, the court’s decision, while deferential to military 
judgment on matters of national defense, also maintained 
  
The chaplain’s principal duties are to conduct religious services (including 
periodic worship, baptisms, marriages, funerals and the like), to furnish 
religious education to soldiers and their families, and to counsel soldiers with 
respect to a wide variety of personal problems. In addition the chaplain, 
because of his close relationship with the soldiers in his unit, often serves as 
a liaison between the soldiers and their commanders, advising the latter of 
racial unrest, drug or alcohol abuse, and other problems affecting the morale 
and efficiency of the unit, and helps to find solutions.  
Id. at 228. 
 165 Id. at 234. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Aden, supra note 7, at 197. 
 170 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 231-32; Aden, supra note 7, at 194. 
 171 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228. 
 172 Aden, supra note 7, at 193. 
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jurisdiction to decide matters involving the military chaplaincy, 
which, as an institution, remains a government agent.173 
B. Defining Proselytization in the Context of the Religion 
Clauses 
In constitutional controversies involving religious 
speech, a basic inquiry by courts is whether the religious 
speech in question is a proselytizing message, as proselytizing 
lies at the nexus of the two religion clauses.174 Like the military 
chaplaincy, the question is whether the religious speech at 
issue is simply a form of free exercise or whether it is an 
impermissible form of government establishment of religion.175 
This question is asked because many courts have essentially 
adopted a “no proselytizing” rule.176 While there is some 
consensus that the Establishment Clause is violated when 
government-sponsored proselytizing occurs, the determination 
of constitutionality ultimately turns on how the court frames 
the legal issue.177 These determinations are complicated because 
the Supreme Court has failed to define proselytization.178 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia179 is a prominent example of a case in which the 
Supreme Court did not believe that the delivery of a religious 
message was proselytizing. There, the Supreme Court held that 
it was constitutionally impermissible for the University of 
Virginia to fund the printing costs of all its student 
publications except the Christian newspaper.180 The denial of 
  
 173 Id. at 207; Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military 
Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REV 1137, 1178 (2007). 
 174 Keiner, supra note 133, at 83. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 83-85. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (prayer 
in question was not unconstitutional because there was no indication the prayer was 
used to exploit, proselytize, or disparage any faith or belief); see also Van Orden v. 
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]here is nothing 
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through public 
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten 
Commandments.” (emphasis added)); Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(Veteran’s Administration must assure existence of a chaplaincy does not create 
Establishment Clause problems because of proselytizing); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 
223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985) (“No chaplain is authorized to proselytize . . . .”). 
 177 Keiner, supra note 133, at 83. 
 178 Id. at 85. 
 179 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 180 The University, a public institution, chose not to fund the Christian 
newspaper because of a University policy that prohibited funding a publication that 
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funds to the Christian newspaper, the Court reasoned, was 
improper even though the newspaper’s editors “committed the 
paper to a two-fold mission: to challenge Christians to live, in 
word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to 
encourage students to consider what a personal relationship 
with Jesus Christ means.”181 As Justice Souter noted in his 
dissent, until Rosenberger, the Court had never “upheld direct 
state funding of the sort of proselytizing published in [the 
Christian newspaper] and, in fact, [had] categorically 
condemned state programs directly aiding religious activity.”182 
Rosenberger thus exemplifies the centrality of judicial framing 
to the ultimate disposition of religious speech controversies: the 
majority did not view the publication of the pamphlet as 
proselytizing, but the dissenting members of the court did. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately 
define proselytization, some federal circuit courts have 
developed proselytization as a legal principle.183 The Third 
Circuit has stated that “[c]ontext is essential. . . . There is a 
marked difference between expression that symbolizes 
individual religious observance, such as wearing a cross on a 
necklace, and expression that proselytizes a particular view.”184 
The Fourth Circuit has also defined proselytizing as distinct 
from the similar concept of passively advancing one’s own 
religion.185 In one case, for example, a Fourth Circuit panel 
stated that, “to ‘proselytize’ on behalf of a particular religious 
belief necessarily means to seek to ‘convert’ others to that 
belief, whereas to ‘advance’ a religious belief means simply to 
‘forward, further, [or] promote’ the belief.”186 Justice Stevens 
  
“primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate 
reality.” Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 181 Id. at 826. (internal citation omitted). The dispositive issue for the Court 
was, however, the University’s regulation requiring public officials to scan student 
publications for their religious content. Id. at 845. According to the Court, this action 
denied a legitimate right to religious speech and ultimately risked “fostering a 
pervasive bias [and] hostility [towards] religion.” Id. at 846. Further, the 
Establishment Clause did not require the University to deny eligibility based on the 
publication’s viewpoint; the University had distanced itself enough from the contents of 
the publication so that there was no reasonable fear or appearance that the 
government had endorsed the speech in question. Id. at 841-42, 861. In fact, to deny 
the student publication money based on its religious content actually upset the notion 
of government neutrality central to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 846. 
 182 Id. at 874-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 183 Keiner, supra note 133, at 101. 
 184 Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 185 Keiner, supra note 133, at 102. 
 186 Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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has also noted this distinction, albeit in dissent: 
“Distinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the one 
hand, from religious proselytizing on the other, is comparable 
to distinguishing meetings to discuss political issues from 
meetings whose principle purpose is to recruit new members to 
join a political organization.”187 The common analytical thread 
of these opinions, including Rosenberger, is the extent to which 
the government actor, as the purveyor of the religious message, 
seeks to convert. Thus, as one author noted, “Proselytizing is 
expressive activity which a reasonable observer would perceive 
attempts to convert the audience from one religious belief, or 
lack of a belief, to another religious belief, or lack thereof.”188 
IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROSELYTIZATION AND 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY  
 Although courts have yet to apply the coercion test 
outside the primary or secondary school context, coercion 
analysis is ripe for Establishment Clause controversies in the 
military context. Applying the coercion test, the incidents of 
proselytization and religious discrimination, if true, are 
unconstitutional. 
A. Adoption of Coercion Analysis for Military 
Establishment Clause Controversies 
The complexity of the Establishment Clause has 
produced a variety of standards for evaluating the 
constitutionality of a state law or action. These standards are 
often applied inconsistently, sporadically, and sometimes, even 
concurrently.189 In lieu of this complex patchwork, the coercion 
test should be used to analyze all claims of religious 
discrimination and proselytizing in the U.S. Military. The 
coercion analysis is appropriate given both the inherently 
coercive nature of military life and the prevalence of religious 
discrimination claims in the U.S. Military. Further, the 
application of the coercion test in these circumstances is 
  
 187 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 128 (2001) 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 188 Keiner, supra note 133, at 104. 
 189 See supra Part II.A. 
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entirely consistent with current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.190 
In attempting to establish the dividing line between 
church and state, the Lemon Court emphasized that the 
Establishment Clause’s purpose was to afford protection from 
state sponsorship of religion, state financial support of religion, 
and active state involvement in private religious activity.191 
Similarly, the Lee Court stated that the Establishment Clause 
was intended to prevent religious activity from becoming so 
pervasive that it becomes, in effect, state-sponsored or state-
directed.192 Although these standards are somewhat amorphous, 
most claims of religious discrimination in the military 
implicate the evils that, according to the Lemon and Lee 
Courts, the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent. 
The seminal case supporting the application of the 
coercion test in Establishment Clause military controversies is 
Mellen v. Bunting. In Mellen, the Fourth Circuit moved away 
from the view of student age as the focal point in 
Establishment Clause challenges to school prayers.193 In 
contrast to Chaudhuri and Brand, the Mellen court focused on 
the entire context in which the students’ claims were raised.194 
The dispositive issue for the court was not the students’ age but 
their enrollment in a school whose adversative-model 
curriculum made them “uniquely susceptible to coercion.”195 By 
rejecting the rigidity of a bright-line limitation based on age, 
the Fourth Circuit moved towards a broad-based and thorough 
analysis of government neutrality towards religion.  
The analysis applied in Mellen not only examines the 
constitutional issue through a more comprehensive perspective 
than the Tanford and Chaudhuri approaches, but is consistent 
with the holding in Lee. Although Lee was limited to primary 
and secondary education,196 the decision did not answer the 
question of whether a state action could coerce mature adults 
  
 190 See supra Part II. 
 191 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 192 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 193 See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging 
that “cadets are not children”). 
 194 Id. at 371-72. 
 195 Id. at 371. 
 196 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. In fact, in Chaudhuri and Tanford, the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits used this reasoning to support their conclusion that mature adults 
are not susceptible to coercion. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 
1997); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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in an educational setting.197 More importantly, in concluding 
that primary- and secondary-school students are vulnerable to 
coercion, Justice Kennedy used age merely as an indication of 
susceptibility, not as a proxy for susceptibility.198 At no point in 
Lee did Kennedy state that younger students are always 
susceptible to coercion while older students are never 
susceptible to coercion. The critical analytical point is thus the 
degree to which those affected are vulnerable to forced religious 
practices. While age may be an indication of vulnerability, it is 
by no means dispositive.  
Given the importance of context in Establishment 
Clause challenges, the coercion test is also an appropriate 
standard outside the school-prayer context. While Lee may be 
limited to circumstances involving school prayer,199 its language 
does not foreclose the possibility that other environments may 
also be coercive. In penning the opinion, Justice Kennedy 
actually spoke in broad terms about the constitutional 
guarantees against government coercion of religion.200 In fact, a 
critical aspect of Kennedy’s reasoning was his view that the 
“objecting student had no real alternative to avoid” attending 
the religious ceremony.201 Coercion analysis is thus ripe for 
controversies involving the military given the uniquely coercive 
nature of military socialization and the chain of command 
hierarchy.202 This standard is especially appropriate in the 
context of proselytizing. Proselytizing is coercive by its very 
nature because its objective is to convert people from one 
religious belief to another (or from nonbelief to belief) by 
convincing them to follow the conveyed religious message.203 
  
 197 “We do not address whether [it] is acceptable if the affected citizens are 
mature adults . . . .” Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 198 See id. 
 199 “The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be 
conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where . . . young graduates who 
object are induced to conform.” Id. at 599. 
 200 “Divisiveness . . . can attend any state decision respecting religion . . . .” Id. 
at 587-88; “[T]he Establishment Clause . . . guarantees at a minimum that a 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise . . . .” Id. at 577. 
 201 Id. at 598. 
 202 See supra Part I.B. 
 203 Keiner, supra note 133, at 104. 
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B. Application of Coercion Analysis to Proselytization in the 
Military 
Although coercion analysis is the proper test for 
Establishment Cause controversies involving the military, the 
alleged religious discrimination and proselytizing discussed in 
Part I are not necessarily unconstitutional. When legal 
controversies involve the establishment of religion in the military, 
there are countervailing considerations of First Amendment Free 
Exercise rights and deference to military decisions that implicate 
national defense. There are also mitigating factors, such as 
voluntariness.204 Taken together, these competing interests create 
somewhat of a balance in controversies over religion in the 
military. The military chaplaincy, for instance, is per se 
constitutional despite the fact that it constitutes a form of state-
funded organized religion.205 Reports of religious discrimination 
and proselytization in the military, however, suggest that this 
equilibrium has shifted in recent years. 
A common argument against judicial intervention in 
military policy is the deference historically given to military 
judgment.206 For example, a critical aspect of the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Katcoff, upholding the constitutionality of the 
military chaplaincy, was that “military decisions reasonably 
relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense . . . 
should be treated as presumptively valid and . . . should be 
resolved as a matter of judicial comity in favor of deference to 
the military’s exercise of its discretion.”207 But this deference is 
not absolute. In striking down a requirement that cadets at 
military colleges attend Sunday religious services, the D.C. 
Circuit noted that “while an individual’s freedoms may of 
necessity be abridged upon his entrance into military life, there 
is no authority for the point that his right to freedom of religion 
is abolished.”208 More broadly, the court held that individual 
  
 204 See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 205 See generally id. 
 206 Rabinowitz, supra note 19, at 925; see also Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234; 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981). 
 207 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 233-34. 
 208 The D.C. Circuit further noted:  
Personal freedoms of conduct and appearance have been accommodated to 
the military’s perceived need to establish procedures best suited to regulate 
its day-to-day operations, duty assignments and call-up orders; to determine 
a reservist’s discharge of his duties; to regulate physical appearance; and to 
ascertain “the essential characteristics of fitness for duty.” This deference to 
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constitutional freedoms cannot be sacrificed for the sake of 
military interests.209 Thus, to the extent that chaplaincy 
proselytization efforts or other questionable practices are 
reasonably relevant to securing a national defense, these 
practices are unconstitutional nonetheless.  
The concept of voluntariness is related to this idea. 
Couched in Katcoff’s rationale regarding judicial deference to 
military decisions was the notion that individuals who enter 
the military necessarily forgo freedoms they may have 
otherwise enjoyed as regular citizens, such as the right to 
travel whenever or wherever one wants.210 The Fourth and D.C. 
Circuits, on the other hand, have explicitly stated that the 
voluntary choice to enroll at military universities or to enlist in 
the military does not abrogate constitutional guarantees.211 
Essentially, the government may not condition enrollment or 
enlistment on unconstitutional conditions.212 Thus, like judicial 
deference to military discretion, the argument that soldiers 
surrender their right to religious freedom when they enter the 
military is tempered by constitutional guarantees.  
As with judicial deference to military discretion and the 
relinquishment of individual freedoms through voluntary 
service, free exercise of religion in the military has its 
limitations. Assuming the truth of the chaplaincy proselytizing 
complaints, the chaplaincy program is a prime example of an 
institution that runs afoul of the Establishment Clause despite 
the right to free exercise.213 In light of the Second Circuit’s 
holding in Katcoff that “no chaplain is authorized to proselytize 
soldiers or their families,”214 it is clear that individual chaplains 
have overstepped their constitutional authority by preaching to 
  
military descionmaking has been justified by the military’s role, its mandate 
to prepare for the waging war, and the necessity for our national security. 
However, deference has inherent limitations which have also been fully 
recognized in judicial decision.  
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 209 Id. at 295. 
 210 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 233. 
 211 Anderson, 466 F.2d at 293; Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 212 Anderson, 466 F.2d at 293. 
 213 See Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1560 (arguing that “[t]he current practice of 
offering chaplain-led prayers during mandatory, nonreligious, Army ceremonies 
violates the Establishment Clause”). 
 214 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228; see also Rosen, supra note 173, at 1178 (noting 
that the Katcoff decision did not “give the military leadership a blank check to 
administer the chaplaincy or religious practices in the armed forces without regard to 
the Establishment Clause”). 
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cadets at military universities to convert fellow cadets.215 
Chaplain-led prayers in the military and at military universities 
have thus become analogous to the religious-oriented graduation 
speeches at primary and secondary schools that the Supreme 
Court has consistently deemed unconstitutional.216 
Like chaplains, the actions of most other purveyors of 
religious discrimination in the military are constitutionally 
suspect under coercion analysis. Unlike chaplaincy policies, 
however, the practices of other actors are unconstitutional not 
simply because they seek to proselytize or discriminate based 
on religious beliefs, but because they amount to overt coercion 
in the context of military socialization and a strict chain of 
command structure, where there is little tolerance for dissent. 
Individual deviation from the group was impractical at best 
when, for example, the USAF Academy head football coach 
invoked Jesus’s name in the team locker room or a USAF 
Academy professor required students to pray before taking 
final exams.217 A soldier’s options are similarly limited during 
religious ceremonies upon return from tours of duty and the 
Naval Academy’s mealtime prayer.218  
More ominous, however, are the actions of those higher 
within the chain of command.219 In the military, a “subordinate 
does not have the realistic ability to tell her or his commanding 
officer that she or he is not interested in her or his religious 
propaganda for fear of reprisals.”220 As a result, subordinates 
are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Any religious 
discrimination or proselytization by superior officers, then, 
should be unconstitutional. 
The allegations of systematic peer ostracism and 
harassment is the more difficult issue.221 Unlike institutional 
discrimination or the proselytizing efforts of superior officers, 
peer discrimination does not necessarily create a coercive 
environment similar to those discussed so far. When soldiers 
hold the same rank within the chain of command, the fear of 
  
 215 Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, paras. 14-17. 
 216 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  
 217 See supra Part I.A-B. 
 218 See supra Part I.A-B. 
 219 See supra Part I.A (detailing an alleged circumstance where a soldier was 
threatened with sanctions by his superior because he was an atheist). 
 220 Schweiker, supra note 38, at 26. 
 221 See supra Part I.A. 
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reprisal for rejecting religious propaganda is likely not the 
same. But when peer groups within the military organize for 
religious objectives, an essentially institutionalized form of 
religious practice results. Peer-organized proselytization has 
the potential to be just as coercive as formal institutionalized 
religious practices.222 For this reason, it should not be tolerated. 
CONCLUSION 
State establishment of religion has long been a 
convoluted area of constitutional law; this is particularly true 
when controversies involve the military. Nevertheless, there is 
significant precedent supporting the use of coercion analysis in 
Establishment Clause controversies that involve the military. 
Under the coercion test, if a person or group of people is 
particularly susceptible to coercion, the state must forebear on 
promoting action that is not neutral towards religion. Without 
this protection, “citizens are subjected to state-sponsored 
religious exercises, [and] the State [has disavowed] its own 
duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience 
and belief which is the mark of a free people.”223 
The extension of the coercion test to matters involving 
the military is apt given the increasing concern in recent years 
about religious discrimination and proselytization in the U.S. 
Military. Using coercion analysis, it is evident that much of the 
religious discrimination and proselytization discussed in Part I, 
if true, is unconstitutional. To cure these constitutional 
infirmities, the military should ensure that its universities, 
superior officers, and overall practices promote religion only in 
a neutral manner. This goal can be accomplished by 
implementing nondiscrimination policies and regulations to be 
enforced in conjunction with existing laws on religious 
neutrality.224 Moreover, for military chaplains to practice within 
  
 222 In Santa Fe, where a student-elected prayer before football games was 
ruled unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that peer-organized proselytization can 
have “the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious 
worship.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000). 
 223 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 224 See DOD Directive No. 1304.19(4.2) (June 11, 2004). The directive states 
that military chaplaincies: 
[s]hall serve a religiously diverse population. Within the military, 
commanders are required to provide comprehensive religious support to all 
authorized individuals within their areas of responsibility. Id. Religious 
Organizations that choose to participate in the Chaplaincies recognize this 
command imperative and express willingness for their Religious Ministry 
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the bounds of the Establishment Clause, they must serve as a 
passive utility to soldiers who request their services and should 
lead services only when attendance is truly noncompulsory. 
More generally, the military should incorporate religious 
components into military life only if it unambiguously 
dissociates itself from the advancement of particular religions 
and creates a zero-tolerance policy for coercive attempts to 
achieve religious conformity.  
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